

DEVELOPMENT AID AS AN ECONOMIC FACTOR IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ELECTION: LESSONS FOR LATVIA

Gunda Reire

gunda.reire@gmail.com

Keywords: *Security Council, non-permanent members, election, development aid*

Increase in the amount of development aid to United Nations' member states is widely seen as a method in securing the vote of developing countries in the elections for the non-permanent member seat of the Security Council, which is the most powerful institution in the sphere of global peace and security. Latvia has put forward its candidature to the non-permanent seat of the Security Council for the term 2026–2027 at the election in 2025, and an increase in the amount of Latvia's development assistance has also been officially mentioned as one of the most important success factors in the elections. This article tests the aforementioned assumption in political behaviour and aims to determine whether the amount of the development aid correlates with success in elections and therefore can be regarded as an economic influence factor. Specifically, the study used a discrete choice model to analyse the data of the Security Council elections of the past ten years and the dynamics of development assistance amounts provided for less developed United Nations' member states by both elected and non-elected candidates. The results suggest that the widely accepted assumption is wrong. Although a candidate country's activities in providing development aid might be regarded as a factor indicating the country's level of integration in United Nations' work and values, development aid does not correlate with the election results in the Security Council and is not a variable having a significant effect on the election results.

Introduction

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the most influential international body in the sphere of maintenance of international peace and security, and ten out of its fifteen seats are awarded to countries on the basis of a vote count in regularly scheduled elections. Nevertheless, 63 of 193 — one third — of the UN member states, Latvia among them, have never been a part

of this institution. Being a member of the UNSC raises a member state's international prestige and indicates its strong commitment to multilateralism and UN values. Therefore, although the non-permanent seat cannot be comparable with the permanent seat in the UNSC in terms of power and influence, countries have always competed to be elected as a non-permanent member of this prominent institution. Latvia also will be running for the

non-permanent seat of the UNSC at the election in 2025 for the term 2026–2027.

Countries that choose to run for a UNSC seat are seeking the most effective ways and methods in their election campaigns to secure a positive vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). An increase in the amount of development aid to developing UN member states is widely seen as a method for securing the vote of these countries, and this influence factor has been significantly outlined during the campaigns by Australia, Finland, and New Zealand.¹ It is worth mentioning that New Zealand had an approach to “rather lose with honour than trade overseas development assistance or policy positions for Security Council votes”², and this strongly underlines the assumption about a connection existing between the amount of development aid and success in the election. In light of this hypothesis, which is widely accepted in foreign policy circles, an increase in the volume of Latvia’s development assistance has also been officially mentioned as a success factor which raises prospects of being elected to the UNSC.³ Latvia’s allocated official development assistance (ODA) volume is currently rather low — it reached USD 40.2 million in 2020 (0.12% of GNI), and the government’s commitment is to achieve a 0.33% ODA/GNI ratio by 2030.⁴

The aim of this article is to determine whether the aforementioned assumption is correct and to analyse whether the amount of the development aid being distributed by the candidate country correlates with success in UNSC elections and therefore can be regarded as an effective economic influence factor. The relevance of such research can be found both in the academic domain and on the practical level. First, academic research, which deals with the link between development aid and UNSC membership, has been mostly focused on developing countries’ benefits while occupying the UNSC non-permanent member’s seat, and the most extensive

research in this field has been carried out by Dreher et al.⁵, De Mesquita and Smith⁶, as well as Kuziemko and Werker⁷. Nevertheless, in spite of widespread assumptions in political circles and activities during election campaigns, the direct link between the allocated development assistance aid and the result in the UNSC election has not been subjected to broad academic scrutiny. Therefore, this research outlines an additional aspect in the academic debate about factors influencing the UNSC election results. Second, since Latvia has also put hopes on the link between development assistance and success in the UNSC election in 2025, this research refers to the actual political goals and methods and therefore contributes to the practical implementation of Latvian foreign policy.

Methodologically, this article draws on the discrete choice model to analyse the data of the UNSC elections of the past ten years, and the dynamics of development assistance amounts provided for developing UN member states by both elected and non-elected candidates over the period of six years — four years before the election, in the election year, and one year after the election. The official UN⁸ and OECD⁹ data is used in analysis.

The article proceeds as follows. First, it outlines the UNSC election procedure and criteria and sums up the election parameters. Second, it analyses the statistics of the UNSC elections by compiling the voting results of each election and indicating the election contestants within regional groups. Third, the article determines the set of discrete alternatives — six sets of UNSC election contestants — and the variable of the alternatives — the allocated amount of the development aid in the time frame of six years. The analysis is carried out to outline the dynamics of development assistance volumes provided for less developed UN member states by both elected and non-elected candidates, and its correlation with the election results. Fourth, the article presents the research findings.

The results of the research are relevant for Latvia on a practical foreign policy level and suggest that the widely accepted assumption about the link between allocated development aid and success in the UNSC election is wrong. Although a stronger engagement in the development agenda and an increase in development aid by the candidate country might be regarded as a contributing factor to the main purposes of the UN, data proves that allocated development aid does not directly correlate with positive results at the UNSC election and therefore cannot be regarded as a variable having a significant effect on the election results.

UNSC elections: the procedure and criteria

The procedure of the UNSC elections defines the set of parameters which are applied to candidates running for the seats of non-permanent members, and Latvia's candidacy for the term of 2026–2027 in the 2025 election will also be framed by these parameters.

Two UN documents regulate the election of the non-permanent members of the UNSC: the UN Charter¹⁰ and the Rules of Procedure of the UNGA¹¹. Under the Charter provisions (Article 23), ten of fifteen UNSC members (non-permanent or rotating members) are elected for a term of two years by the UNGA. The same article also specifies the length of the term — two years — and provides for a prohibition on being immediately re-elected, therefore avoiding the situation that a non-permanent member can become a *de facto* permanent member. To ensure an uninterrupted work cycle, the UNGA elects five members each year, and this is regulated by the Rules of Procedure of the UNGA (Rule 142). Under the UN Charter (Article 18), election to the UNSC is defined as an important question, which requires a two-thirds majority vote in the UNGA, and it is calculated from members present and voting, or in other words — casting an affirmative or

negative vote, while members abstaining are considered not voting.

The more specific procedure of the elections of the UNSC non-permanent members is governed by the Rules of Procedure of the UNGA, and specifically by Rules 92–94.

First, elections to the UNSC are held by secret ballot, and this rule is important when considering different criteria of influence and lobbying on a practical level. This rule and praxis also mean that the outcomes and results of the UNSC elections are never assured.¹²

Second, official nominations are not required, and candidates announce their intention to run, usually many years ahead. The candidates inform their regional group of their intention to run and seek their support, and this is a crucial factor for success in elections. Formally, the candidate country informs the rotating chair of its regional group, identifying the two-year term for which it intends to become a non-permanent member. It is a usual practice that candidates send the same kind of information also to the president of the UNGA or the Secretariat. This tradition not only supports a good communication environment, but also clearly indicates whether or not UNSC elections will be contested.

Latvia officially announced its future intention to become a UNSC non-permanent member for the first time in 2011 with an Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia¹³, and then in 2020 presented its candidature for the term 2026–2027 at the elections in 2025 with an official announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹⁴, through the statement of the President of Latvia at the UNGA General debates¹⁵ and with a reference in the annual foreign policy report¹⁶. It is noteworthy that Latvia will participate in a contested election since Montenegro has also announced its intention to run for the same Eastern European seat in 2025 election, as reflected in the statement by the Prime Minister of Montenegro in the UNGA General debates already in 2013.¹⁷

Third, Rule 93 of the Rules of Procedure of the UNGA defines the procedure that applies when only member is to be elected and no candidate obtains in the first ballot the majority required. In that case, a second ballot is taken, which is restricted to the two candidates obtaining the largest number of votes, and the balloting is continued until one candidate secures two thirds of the votes cast. If neither candidate once again receives the necessary two-thirds majority on the second and third ballots, the same rule allows casting of votes for “an eligible member”, which allows new candidates to join the election process. If a non-permanent member is still not elected during three of such unrestricted ballots, the pool again is reduced to the top two candidates, and the cycle repeats until a member is elected. Application of this rule is clearly visible in Table 1: it shows elections where more than one round was carried out (in 2011, there were even 17 rounds in which Azerbaijan and Hungary competed) and where new candidates — “the eligible members” — joined the election cycle.

The UN Charter (Article 23) also provides three criteria, although very general, that UNGA members should consider when electing the UNSC: contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organisation, and to equitable geographical distribution.

The first criteria, contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security — refers to the main aim of the UN and is generally understood as participation in the UN missions, human resources (personnel) and financial contributions for processes supporting peace. Although in recent years the emphasis has shifted slightly away from this criterion, in the election campaigns it is never forgotten and many countries devote lots of resources and campaign elements to this aim¹⁸, which, under the UN Charter, is the main purpose of the whole organisation and the primary task of the UNSC. In contrast,

contribution to other purposes of the UN, can be interpreted very broadly, and is mainly dependent on the actual international agenda. Among other topical issues, the importance of development goals has risen exponentially since the beginning of this century within the UN structures, and nowadays, increase in volume of development assistance to UN member states is widely seen as an economic influence factor and an effective method in the securing of voting commitments of less developed member states. This assumption is being tested in this article.

Regarding the second criteria, the UN Charter does not define parameters for equitable geographical distribution and does not provide any directions on how it should be achieved. Nevertheless, in the UN, regional electoral groups exist as a basis for distribution of different UN posts. For purposes of election to the UNSC, the formula is set out in UNGA resolution 1991 A (XVIII)¹⁹ of 1963, but Resolution 2847 (XXVI)²⁰ of 1971 split the African and Asian states (five seats) into two separate regions. According to UN customary law, these five seats are divided into two seats for Asian states, and three — for African states. Additionally, one seat from the five is reserved for an Arab state, and the Asian and African regional groups take turns to provide a candidate to this so-called “Arab swing seat”.

In 2021, there exist five regional groups in the UN²¹, and their membership is not equally large: the African Group with 54 members, the Asia-Pacific Group with 54 members, the Eastern European Group (to which Latvia belongs) with 23 members, the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) with 33 members, and the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) with 28 members and the US as an observer and a member of this group for electoral purposes.

According to the formula²², three of ten non-permanent UNSC seats are allocated to the African group: one seat is elected every

even year; two seats are elected during odd years. The process of selection of candidates for the African Group takes place within the African Union and these seats are usually uncontested. One of the two UNSC seats allocated to the Asia-Pacific Group comes up for election every odd calendar year, but the so-called Arab swing seat is divided every odd calendar year between the Asia-Pacific Group and the African Group. Two non-permanent seats are allocated to the GRULAC group, with one seat coming up for election every year. Since 2007, candidates for the GRULAC seat have mainly run unopposed. Every odd year, one seat is allocated to the Eastern European Group. Two seats are allocated for the WEOG group.

To sum up, the procedure of the elections of the UNSC defines the following parameters: (1) a member state runs for the seat within the regional quota; (2) elections are held by secret ballot and require a two-thirds UNGA majority vote; (3) campaigning for the UNSC can involve significant investments in human and financial resources in the sphere of maintenance of peace and security and other relevant areas of the UN work; and (4) candidacy can be contested within the regional group.

The contested UNSC elections

To determine whether an increase of the amount of the development aid correlates with success in UNSC elections and therefore can

be regarded as an economic influence factor, the statistics of the UNSC elections over the past ten years are analysed. First, the voting results of each election are compiled by outlining the results of each candidate country in each voting round. Second, based on the dynamics of these rounds, the election contestants within regional groups are indicated, if eligible. This step makes it possible to determine the set of discrete alternatives which are exclusive, different, and complete and can be later analysed using a discrete choice model to outline the dynamics of development assistance amounts provided for less developed UN member states by both elected and non-elected candidates, and its correlation with the election results.

During the last ten years, the contested UNSC elections have mainly concerned the WEOG seats (*Table 1*), although three uncontested elections have also taken place. The number of election rounds has varied a great deal during the last ten years — starting from 1 up till 17 in 2011, thus indicating the possibility of a very tense and lengthy process. Also, “eligible members”, as Rule 93 of the Rules of Procedure of the UNGA states, have used the procedural possibility to join the process, even during the last election round (San Marino in 2006 and Hungary in 2011), though such moves have not proved to be effective.

Table 1. UNSC election results and regional contestants (2010–2020)

Elections	Rounds	Voting results*	Contestants**
2010	Round 1	India 187, Colombia 186, South Africa 182, Germany 128 , Portugal 122, Canada 114, Pakistan 1, Swaziland 1	Portugal and Canada
	Round 2	Portugal 113, Canada 78	
	Round 3	Portugal 150 , Canada 32	

2011	Round 1	Guatemala 191, Morocco 151, Pakistan 129, Togo 119, Mauritania 98, Azerbaijan 74, Slovenia 67, Kyrgyzstan 55, Hungary 52, Fiji 1	Togo and Mauritania; Azerbaijan and Slovenia
	Round 2	Togo 119, Slovenia 97, Azerbaijan 90, Mauritania 72	
	Round 3	Togo 131, Slovenia 99, Azerbaijan 93, Mauritania 61	
	...		
	Round 17	Azerbaijan 155, Slovenia 13, Hungary 1	
2012	Round 1	Argentina 182, Rwanda 148, Australia 140, Luxembourg 128, Republic of Korea 116, Finland 108, Cambodia 62, Bhutan 20, United Republic of Tanzania 3, Barbados 1, Cuba 1, Democratic Republic of the Congo 1	Luxembourg and Finland; Korea, Cambodia and Bhutan
	Round 2	Republic of Korea 149, Luxembourg 131, Finland 62, Cambodia 43	
2013	Round 1	Lithuania 187, Chile 186, Nigeria 186, Chad 184, Saudi Arabia 176 (declined), Senegal 2, The Gambia 2, Lebanon 1, Croatia 1	None
	Round 2	Jordan 178, Saudi Arabia 1	
2014	Round 1	Angola 190, Malaysia 187, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 181, New Zealand 145, Spain 131, Turkey 109, Democratic Republic of the Congo 1, Brazil 1	Spain and Turkey
	Round 2	Spain 120, Turkey 73	
	Round 3	Spain 132, Turkey 60	
2015	Round 1	Senegal 187, Uruguay 185, Japan 184, Egypt 179, Ukraine 177	None
2016	Round 1	Ethiopia 185, Bolivia 183, Sweden 134, the Nether- lands 125, Kazakhstan 113, Italy 113, Thailand 77, Colombia 1, Cuba 1, Belgium 1	The Netherlands and Italy; Kazakhstan and Thailand
	Round 2	Kazakhstan 178, the Netherlands 99, Italy 92, Thailand 55	
	Round 3	The Netherlands 96, Italy 94	
	...		
	Round 6	Italy 179, the Netherlands 4, San Marino 1	
2017	Round 1	Poland 190, Côte d'Ivoire 189, Kuwait 188, Peru 186, Equatorial Guinea 185, the Netherlands 184, Argentina 1, Guinea 1, Morocco 1	None
2018	Round 1	Dominican Republic 184, Germany 184, South Af- rica 183, Belgium 181, Indonesia 144, Maldives 46	Indonesia and Maldives

2019	Round 1	Viet Nam 192; Niger 191; Tunisia 191; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 185; Estonia 111; Romania 78; El Salvador 6; Georgia 1; Latvia 1	Estonia and Romania; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and El Salvador
	Round 2	Estonia 132; Romania 58	
2020	Round 1	India 184; Ireland 128; Mexico 187; Norway 130; Kenya 113; Djibouti 78	Kenya and Djibouti
	Round 2	Kenya 129; Djibouti 62	

* Elected UNSC members are marked in bold; the number after the name of the member state indicates the received supportive UNGA votes.

** The candidates that received only one, two or three UNGA votes, for statistical reasons are not considered as *de facto* contestants and are not indicated in this table.

Source: Author's calculations based on the Security Council Report data²³

The data shows that contested UNSC elections are fairly frequent, nevertheless these take place only in a few regional groups, and a tense contest is an exceedingly rare phenomenon. The main regional groups where contested elections take place are the WEOG and the Eastern European group.

On the basis of the compiled data and for the purposes of this article, the analysis of the dynamics of allocated development assistance aid will be limited to developed countries and further assessed regarding the following candidate countries which participated in the elections as contestants: Portugal and Canada (2011, WEOG); Luxembourg and Finland (2012, WEOG); Spain and Turkey (2014, WEOG), the Netherlands and Italy (2016, WEOG); Kazakhstan and Thailand (2016, Asia-Pacific Group) and Estonia and Romania (2019, Eastern European Group). Contestants, which are development assistance recipients²⁴ (low and middle-income countries based on gross national income per capita as indicated by the World Bank and least developed countries as defined by the UN), for the purposes of the aim of this article will not be analysed, as they do not satisfy the primary analysis criteria. The tense contest between Azerbaijan and Slovenia will also not be included in the analysis, because Azerbaijan has only been considered an emerging

provider of ODA since 2011 and still receives ODA²⁵; and at the time of UNSC election, Azerbaijan was not among ODA donors.

Allocated development aid and the results of the UNSC elections

To test the assumption that increases in development aid by candidate countries serve as an economic influence factor in the UNSC elections and help in achieving positive results, the discrete choice model has been applied in this research. There are six sets of discrete alternatives: Portugal and Canada (2011) Luxembourg and Finland (2012) Spain and Turkey (2014), the Netherlands and Italy (2016) Kazakhstan and Thailand (2016), and Estonia and Romania (2019), which are different, exclusive, and non-cumulative, since in every election only one of the contestants could be elected.

The set variable of the alternatives is the allocated amount of the development aid in the time frame of six years — four years before the UNSC election, in the year of the election, and a year after the election. The selected time frame is chosen to determine whether there is a connection between growing allocated development aid amounts before the UNSC elections where particular contestants participate and to consider the dynamics of the volumes

of the development aid after the election. The OECD data about official development assistance (ODA) is used, which compiles the amount of government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic de-

velopment and welfare of developing countries and is provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, or is concessional in a form of grants and soft loans.²⁶




Fig. 1. ODA volumes by Portugal and Canada (disbursements, million USD), 2006–2011

Source: author's calculations based on OECD data²⁷




Fig. 2. ODA volumes by Australia, Luxembourg, and Finland (disbursements, million USD), 2008–2013

Source: author's calculations based on OECD data²⁸

In the 2010 UNSC election, the disparity between allocated ODA amounts by two contestants — Portugal and Canada — was incontrovertible. Portugal’s ODA was more than eight times less than Canada’s (Fig. 1). In the election year, Canada increased the development aid amounts by more than 1.2 billion USD, but such a step obviously did not qualify as an influence factor in the UNSC election, since Portugal was elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC.

In the 2012 election, three member states had put forward their candidacy for two available UNSC seats for the WEOG. Australia was elected in the first round with a convincing 140 votes, leaving Luxembourg and Finland for the second election round. During the UNSC election campaign, Australia focused on a development agenda, announcing a development aid target of 0.5 per cent of GNI by 2015 and made a visible increase in ODA.²⁹ Australia’s case shows that an increase in ODA correlates

with positive results in the UNSC election (Fig. 2). Nevertheless, the results of the two remaining contestants — Luxembourg and Finland — do not support such a correlation, since the second available UNSC seat was allocated by the UNGA to Luxembourg, whose ODA was more than three times less than Finland’s and which did not have rising ODA tendencies during last four years (Fig. 2). It is acknowledged that although Finland put a strong (but not specifically focused) emphasis on development cooperation issues during the campaign, it was not broadly supported by the least developed countries in Africa in the election.³⁰

The data of the 2014 UNSC election highlights the peculiar case of Spain. First, it shows that Spain, which in the beginning of the twenty-first century was ranked as one of the generous development aid donors, lost its profile after the global financial crisis. Spain’s ODA amounts declined by three times over a period of five years and reached their lowest




Fig. 3. ODA volumes by Spain and Turkey (disbursements, million USD), 2010–2015

Source: author’s calculations based on OECD data³¹

point in 2014 — the year of the UNSC election. Nevertheless, this negative tendency did not serve as an impediment, and Spain was elected, although Turkey, the other contestant, had higher ODA volumes (Fig. 3) and it did not experience similar financial difficulties affecting the flow of development aid. It must be noted that Turkey's case is specific: this state participates to the full extent in two UN regional groups — the WEOG and the Asia-Pacific group. Nevertheless, for electoral purposes, Turkey is considered a member of the WEOG alone.

A contested UNSC election took place in 2016 with two sets of contestants in two regional member state groups — Kazakhstan and Thailand (Asia-Pacific group) and Italy and the Netherlands (WEOG). Neither of these cases supports the assumption that an increase in ODA volumes serves as a supportive economic factor in UNSC elections. The contested seat between Kazakhstan and Thailand was allocated by the UNGA to

Kazakhstan despite the fact that Thailand's ODA is larger, and, in the election year, it exceeded Kazakhstan's development assistance by more than five times (Fig. 4).

The data about the second set of contestants of the 2016 election also does not prove the assumption that bigger ODA amounts lead to success in a UNSC election: although the Netherlands had been historically more generous than Italy and even demonstrated a peak result one year before the election, the UNGA elected the second candidate (Fig. 5).

In 2019, Latvia' neighbouring country, Estonia, was elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, and its case shows that the volume of ODA does not correlate with success in the election. Estonia competed with Romania for the Eastern European group's seat in the UNSC and succeeded despite the fact that its ODA had not changed in the previous four years, remaining at a rather low 49–50 million USD, while Romania's ODA rose constantly




Fig. 4. ODA volumes by Kazakhstan and Thailand (disbursements, million USD), 2012–2017

Source: author's calculations based on OECD data³²




Fig. 5. ODA volume by Italy and the Netherlands (disbursements, million USD), 2012–2017

Source: author's calculations based on OECD data³³




Fig. 6. ODA volumes by Estonia and Romania (disbursements, million USD), 2015–2020

Source: author's calculations based on OECD data³⁴

and was five times higher than Estonia's in the year of election.

Therefore, none of the analysed cases support the correlation between rising or large ODA volumes by UNSC candidate country and a positive result in the UNSC election.

Conclusions

The widely accepted assumption about a correlation between an increase in allocated development aid by a candidate country and success in the UNSC election is not supported by research findings. A candidate country's activities in the domain of global development might be regarded as a contribution to the main purposes of the organisation and therefore strengthen the argument about general conformity with the overarching criteria set forth in the UN Charter. Nevertheless, allocated development aid does not correlate with positive election results in the UNSC and therefore cannot be regarded as an effective UNSC election campaign method and an economic influence factor in the UNSC election for a non-permanent member seat.

These findings are relevant for Latvia in practical terms since this country has put forward its candidature for a non-permanent seat of the UNSC at the elections in 2025 and officially indicated an increase in the development aid volume as one of the success factors in the elections. Since the analysis of the UNSC election results over the period of ten years show that the ODA volumes do not correlate with election results, a broader analysis of different UNSC election campaigns and their success and failure factors are to be carried out to take lessons from them and to shape and profile Latvia's campaign for the election in the UNSC.

Acknowledgment

This article has been created with support from the National Research Programme's Project "INTERFRAME-LV" and was present-

ed in the IV International Economic Forum on 17 September 2021.

Šis raksts ir tapis valsts pētījumu programmas projekta "INTERFRAME-LV" ietvaros un tika prezentēts IV Starptautiskajā Ekonomikas Forumā 2021. gada 17. septembrī.

*The article is peer-reviewed.
The electronic version of the article
has been given a DOI number.
Raksts ir recenzēts.*

*Raksta elektroniskajai versijai
ir piešķirts DOI numurs.*

References

- ¹ Taking Stock, Moving Forward: Report to the Foreign Ministry of Finland on the 2012 Elections to the United Nations Security Council. International Peace Institute, 2013; Langmore J., Farrall J. Can elected members make a difference in the UN Security Council? Australia's Experience in 2013–2014. *Global Governance*, 2016, 22 (1): 59–77. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/44861181 Viewed on 27 June 2021; Dreher A. et al. The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council. *Public Choice*, 2014, 158 (1/2): 51–83. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/24507727 Viewed on 27 June 2021; Malone D. Eyes on the prize: The quest for nonpermanent seats on the UN Security Council. *Global Governance*, 2000, 6 (1): 3–23.
- ² McCully M. Seeking a Security Council voice. *New Zealand International Review*, 2012, 37 (5): 14–16. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/48551342 Viewed on 27 June 2021.
- ³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. Annual Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the accomplishments and further work with respect to national foreign policy and the European Union 2020, p. 7. Annual_Report_of_the_Minister_of_Foreign_Affairs-2020.pdf (mfa.gov.lv) Viewed on 2 June 2021; Ministry of

- Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. Annual Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the accomplishments and further work with respect to national foreign policy and the European Union 2019, p. 5. https://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/ministrija/Annual_Report_of_the_Minister_of_Foreign_Affairs_2019.pdf Viewed on 2 June 2021; Ministru kabineta rīkojums Nr. 245. Par Attīstības sadarbības politikas pamatnostādņem 2021.–2027. gadam. Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia. Adopted on 14.04.2021, in force since 14.04.2021. <https://likumi.lv/ta/id/322455-par-attistibas-sadarbibas-politikas-pamatnostadnem-2021-2027-gadam> Viewed on 2 June 2021.
- 4 OECD. Latvia. *Development Co-operation Profiles*. Paris: OECD Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1787/231c67ca-en> Viewed on 27 June 2021.
 - 5 Dreher A. et al. The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council. *Public Choice*, 2014, 158 (1/2): 51–83. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24507727 Viewed on 27 June 2021.
 - 6 De Mesquita B. B., Smith A. The pernicious consequences of UN Security Council membership. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2010, 54 (5): 667–686. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20773715 Viewed on 27 June 2021.
 - 7 Kuziemko I., Werker E. How much is a seat on the Security Council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations. *Journal of Political Economy*, 2006, 114 (5): 905–930. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/507155 Viewed on 27 June 2021.
 - 8 Security Council Report. Security Council Elections 2019; Security Council Elections 2018; Security Council Elections 2017; Security Council Elections 2016. Research Reports. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/elections-to-the-security-council/> Viewed on 1 June 2021.
 - 9 OECD. *Development Co-operation Profiles*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1787/2dcf1367-en> Viewed on 25 May 2021; OECD. *Development Co-operation Report 2011: 50th Anniversary Edition*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011. <https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2011-en> Viewed on 25 May 2021; OECD. *Development Co-operation Report 2010*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010. <https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2010-en> Viewed on 25 May 2021; OECD. *Development Co-operation Report 2009*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2009. <https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2009-en> Viewed on 25 May 2021; OECD. *Net Official Development Assistance in 2008*. <https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/42458612.pdf> Viewed on 25 May 2021.
 - 10 United Nations Charter. United Nations. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter> Viewed on 2 June 2021.
 - 11 Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly. United Nations. <https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/ropga/> Viewed on 2 June 2021.
 - 12 Malone D. Eyes on the prize: The quest for nonpermanent seats on the UN Security Council. *Global Governance*, 2000, 6 (1): 3–23 (18).
 - 13 Ministru kabineta rīkojums Nr. 401. Par Latvijas Republikas kandidatūras izvirzīšanu Apvienoto Nāciju Organizācijas Drošības padomes vēlēšanās. Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia. Adopted on 24.08.2011, in force since 24.08.2011. <https://likumi.lv/ta/id/234938> Viewed on 2 June 2021.
 - 14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. *Candidatures of Latvia and its Representatives for the UN system bodies*. <https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/international-organizations/latvia-at-the-united-nations/candidatures-of-latvia> Viewed on 2 June 2021.

- ¹⁵ United Nations. Address of the President of Latvia, Egils Levits, at the United Nations General Assembly general debate. https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20200922/T3qdozGNpyYp/8QTx71NJub7_en.pdf Viewed on 2 June 2021.
- ¹⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. Annual Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the accomplishments and further work with respect to national foreign policy and the European Union 2018. https://www.mfa.gov.lv/images/ministrija/Annual_Report_of_the_Minister_of_Foreign_Affairs_2018_en.pdf Viewed on 2 June 2021.
- ¹⁷ United Nations. Statement by H. E. Milo Djukanovic, Prime Minister of Montenegro, at the General Debate of the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/ME_en.pdf Viewed on 2 June 2021.
- ¹⁸ Security Council Report. Security Council Elections 2019; Security Council Elections 2018; Security Council Elections 2017; Security Council Elections 2016. Research Reports. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/elections-to-the-security-council/> Viewed on 1 June 2021.
- ¹⁹ U.N. Doc. A/RES/1991(XVIII). United Nations. Adopted on 17.12.1963. [https://undocs.org/A/RES/1991\(XVIII\)](https://undocs.org/A/RES/1991(XVIII)) Viewed on 20 June 2021.
- ²⁰ U.N. Doc. A/RES/2847(XXVI). Adopted on 20.12.2971. [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2847\(XXVI\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2847(XXVI)) Viewed on 5 March 2021.
- ²¹ United Nations. Regional groups of Member States. <https://www.un.org/dgacm/en/content/regional-groups> Viewed on 20 June 2021.
- ²² U.N. Doc. A/RES/1991(XVIII). United Nations. Adopted on 17.12.1963. [https://undocs.org/A/RES/1991\(XVIII\)](https://undocs.org/A/RES/1991(XVIII)) Viewed on 20 June 2021.
- ²³ Security Council Report. Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Elections%20Table%201946-2018.pdf> Viewed on 1 June 2021; Security Council Report. Security Council Elections 2021. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/unsc_elections_2021.pdf Viewed on 1 June 2021.
- ²⁴ OECD. DAC List of ODA Recipients. [https://undocs.org/A/RES/1991\(XVIII\)](https://undocs.org/A/RES/1991(XVIII)) Viewed on 20 June 2021.
- ²⁵ OECD. Azerbaijan. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/development-cooperation-profiles_f112d1b2-en Viewed on 1 June 2021.
- ²⁶ OECD. Official Development Assistance (ODA). <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm> Viewed on 1 June 2021.
- ²⁷ OECD. Development Co-operation Profiles. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1787/2dcf1367-en> Viewed on 25 May 2021; OECD. Development Co-operation Report 2011: 50th Anniversary Edition. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011. <https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2011-en> Viewed on 25 May 2021; OECD. Development Co-operation Report 2010. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010. <https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2010-en> Viewed on 25 May 2021; OECD. Development Co-operation Report 2009. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2009. <https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2009-en> Viewed on 25 May 2021.

- ²⁸ OECD. Development Co-operation Profiles. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1787/2dcf1367-en> Viewed on 25 May 2021; OECD. Net Official Development Assistance in 2008. <https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/42458612.pdf> Viewed on 25 May 2021.
- ²⁹ Langmore J., Farrall J. Can elected members make a difference in the UN Security Council? Australia's Experience in 2013–2014. *Global Governance*, 2016, 22 (1): 59–77. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/444861181 Viewed on 27 June 2021.
- ³⁰ Taking Stock..., op. cit.
- ³¹ OECD. Development Co-operation Profiles. Profiles, op. cit. Viewed on 25 May 2021
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ Ibid.

About the Author

Dr. Gunda Reire is Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia and Director of the Centre for International Studies. She holds the position of visiting professor at the Riga Graduate School of Law and Riga Stradiņš University. Her core research interests include global peace and security, strategic communications, Russia, and multilateral cooperation. She has served as Deputy Chairperson of the Strategic Analysis Commission under the auspices of the President of Latvia, Chief of Staff of the Speaker's Office, and Advisor to several ministers. She holds a doctoral degree in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Latvia. G. Reire has held a Residing Fulbright Research Fellow position at the John Hopkins University's SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations.

Par autori

Dr. Gunda Reire ir Latvijas Republikas ārlietu ministra padomniece un Starptautisko pētījumu centra direktore, darbojas arī kā viesdocente Rīgas Stradiņa Universitātē un Rīgas Juridiskajā augstskolā. Pētnieciskās intereses aptver globālo mieru un drošību, stratēģisko komunikāciju, Krievijas studijas un daudzpusējo sadarbību. Pildījusi Stratēģiskās analīzes komisijas, kas darbojās Valsts prezidentes Vairas Vīķes-Freibergas paspārnē, priekšsēdētājas vietnieces pienākumus, bijusi Saeimas priekšsēdētājas biroja vadītāja un vairāku ministru padomniece. Latvijas Universitātē ieguvusi doktora grādu politikas zinātnē, starptautiskajās attiecībās. Bijusi Fulbraita programmas stipendiāte zinātniskajā pētniecībā Džona Hopkina Universitātes SAIS Transatlantisko attiecību centrā ASV.

ATTĪSTĪBAS PALĪDZĪBA KĀ EKONOMISKS FAKTORS ANO DROŠĪBAS PADOMES VĒLĒŠANĀS: MĀCĪBA LATVIJAI

Gunda Reire

gunda.reire@gmail.com

Kopsavilkums

Atslēgas vārdi: *Drošības padome, nepastāvīgie locekļi, vēlēšanas, attīstības palīdzība*

Attīstības palīdzības apjoma pieaugums ANO dalībvalstīm tiek plaši uzskatīts kā metode, lai nodrošinātu attīstības valstu balsis ANO Drošības padomes — visietekmīgākās institūcijas globālā miera un drošības jomā — nepastāvīgo locekļu vēlēšanās. Latvija ir pieteikusi savu kandidatūru ANO Drošības padomes nepastāvīgā locekļa vietai 2025. gada vēlēšanās uz termiņu no 2026. līdz 2027. gadam, un arī Latvijas attīstības palīdzības finansējuma apjoma palielinājums ir ticis oficiāli minēts kā viens no potenciāli nozīmīgākajiem veiksmes faktoriem vēlēšanās. Rakstā iztirzāts minētais pieņēmums, un tā pētnieciskais mērķis ir noteikt, vai ANO Drošības padomes vēlēšanu praksē attīstības palīdzības finansējuma apjoms korelē ar pozitīvu rezultātu vēlēšanās un tādējādi var tikt uzskatīts par ekonomiskās ietekmes faktoru. Pētījumā aprēķinu veikšanai pielietots diskrētās izvēles modelis un analizēti ANO Drošības padomes vēlēšanu dati pēdējo desmit gadu ietvarā (2010–2020), kā arī attīstības palīdzības finansējuma apjomi, kas novirzīti mazāk attīstītajām ANO dalībvalstīm gan no ievēlēto, gan neievēlēto kandidātvalstu puses. Pētījuma rezultāti plaši izplatīto pieņēmumu neapstiprina. Lai arī kandidātvalstu aktivitātes attīstības palīdzības sniegšanā var tikt uzskatītas par faktoru, kas norāda uz šo valstu integrācijas līmeni ANO darbā un vērtībās, to sniegtās attīstības palīdzības apjoms nekorelē ar veiksmi ANO Drošības padomes vēlēšanās un tādējādi nav uzskatāms par mainīgo lielumu, kam piemistu būtiska ietekme uz vēlēšanu rezultātiem.